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Introduction 
 
The continuing presence of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe’s political 
landscape since the 1990s is a phenomenon escaping explanations centred on the level 
of individual countries. In spite of the 1998 split of the Front National, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen came in second in the French 2002 presidential elections. He received a 
respectable share of the vote even in 2007, faced with a the Gaullist candidate who 
heavily emphasized law and order stances, and whose credibility in implementing 
important policy changes was obviously higher than that of a challenger no other party 
accepts as a coalition partner. Strong right-wing populist parties also exist in Austria, 
Switzerland, Flemish Belgium and in Denmark, among others. At the same time, right-
wing populist parties have not achieved a breakthrough in countries such as Germany 
and Britain.  
Right-wing populist parties should be seen, I suggest in this paper, in the larger 
context of changing societal structures that have affected party systems since the late 
1960s. A first transformation of the underlying dimensions of conflict occurred in the 
1970s and 1980s, when parties of the New Left took up the issues of the New Social 
Movements that had emerged after 1968 (Kitschelt 1994). In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, a second transformation of political space occurred, when new issues such as 
the defence of traditional norms and of the traditional national community rose to 
prominence, and right-wing populist parties achieved electoral breakthroughs in 
several countries. Although there is disagreement on the origin and the proper labelling 
of this new division, a basic consensus exists that a new cultural line of conflict now 
structures party competition in several Western European countries (Kitschelt 1994, 
Bornschier 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Because I interpret the populist right as part 
of a broad counter-movement to the universalistic principles endorsed by the New 
Left, I propose to characterize the antagonism underlying this cultural line of conflict 
as one opposing libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values and 
conceptions of community. Differing values that are anchored in societies’ social 
structures are thus the basis of the new cultural conflict that has come to characterize 
Western European party systems. 
Although this new division can be shown to structure party competition in a number 
of countries in Western Europe (Bornschier 2005, Kriesi 2006), right-wing populist 
2 
parties have not emerged everywhere. In this paper, I present an analytical model that 
focuses on two factors that impinge on the way new conflicts and the structural 
potentials underlying them may be mobilized by political actors. First of all, the 
mobilization space available for new parties depends on how rooted the electorate is in 
the older conflicts that have brought Western European party systems into being, most 
notably the class and religious cleavages. New divides will only materialize if the 
established cleavage structure no longer “organizes” issues cutting across existing 
lines of division “out of politics”, in Schattschneider’s (1975 [1960]: Ch. 4) famous 
words. Building on this insight, my model puts central emphasis on the role of political 
conflict in forging, as well as maintaining the collective identities that underlie 
cleavages.  
The second factor conditioning the chances for new political actors to assert 
themselves refers to the strategies pursued by the established parties with respect to 
the issues that challenging parties such as those of the populist right thrive on. Where 
the established parties succeed in retaining the ownership of issues related to 
immigration and traditionalist norms, the mobilization space for right-wing populist 
challengers will be restrained. In this paper, I pay special attention to the way the 
established parties have responded to the two-fold transformation of political space 
referred to above. By emphasizing the role of agency both in the initial mobilization, 
as well as in the subsequent perpetuation of cleavages, this approach integrates a 
cleavage-theoretical and a strategic, actor-centred perspective. Differing from classical 
cleavage approaches, then, the programmatic content of party competition and the 
positions parties take on political issues are central to my approach.  
The interplay between these two conditioning factors will be illustrated in an 
analysis of the patterns of opposition prevalent in the French and in the German party 
systems since the mid-1970s. In France, the Front National was able to entrench itself 
early on in the French party system, establishing a three-block pattern of opposition 
between the left, the established right, and a new actor situated at the traditionalist-
communitarian pole of the new cultural divide. In Germany, on the other hand, the 
established parties have jointly averted the entry of a party mobilizing on the issues of 
immigration and national identity, and the structural potentials underlying the 
libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide manifest themselves 
in tempered form in this country.  
3 
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, I depict in more detail 
how the rise of new cultural issues has resulted in a new line of conflict in Western 
European party systems. The second section discusses the impact of historical 
cleavages and political agency on the mobilization of new political divides. Building 
on the central role of political conflict in perpetuating cleavages, the ensuing section 
develops an analytical model that differentiates various types of divide that have 
varying consequences for the manifestation of new political conflicts and for the 
fortunes of new parties seeking to thrive on these conflicts.  
In the fourth section, the model is applied to the transformation of the French and 
the German party systems. I assess the role of the existing cleavages and that of 
political agency in shaping the way the new structural potentials have been mobilized 
by political parties. After presenting some aggregate results concerning the patterns of 
competition prevalent in the two countries, I focus on the positions of parties and 
voters along the evolving cultural divide. The analysis covers one election in the 1970s 
and three elections between the late 1980s and early 2000s. To assess the 
programmatic positions of parties, I rely on data based on a sentence-by-sentence 
coding of the newspaper coverage of election campaigns that has been assembled 
within a larger research project (see Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). To which degree party 
positions correspond to the preferences of their voters is assessed by measuring the 
positions of party electorates along the same dimensions of political conflict using 
survey data. The results suggest that both the strength of existing alignments, as well 
as the strategies of the mainstream parties have impinged heavily on the fortunes of 
right-wing populist parties in Western Europe in the past decades.  
 
 
Value Divides, the Transformation of Western European Party Systems, 
and the Rise of the Populist Right 
 
While European party systems continue to carry the stamp of the historical class and 
religious cleavages, the dimensions underlying party interactions have been 
transformed. A first restructuring of political space occurred as a consequence of the 
mobilization of the New Social Movements of the left in the 1970s and 1980s 
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(Kitschelt 1994). This process has led to a transformation of Social Democratic parties 
as well as to the emergence of Ecologist parties, which have come to constitute the 
left-libertarian pole of a new cultural dimension of conflict that has succeeded the 
value divisions characteristic of the religious cleavage. Spurred by the educational 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the diffusion of universalistic values has led actors 
to call for the political enforcement of the principle of individual autonomy and the 
free choice of lifestyles. In a longer perspective, these developments can be seen as 
part of a long-term trend of secularization, as Flanagan and Lee (2003) have argued. 
Already in the 1980s, however, the contours of an opposing conception of commu-
nity, and of a different justification of moral principles has emerged in the form of the 
neo-conservative movement. Intellectuals and conservative political parties placed a 
renewed emphasis on tradition as a necessary binding force for society, and propagated 
solidarity in established communities such as the family as an antidote to the perils of 
individualization. While neo-conservatism remained an elitist ideology, the conserva-
tive counter-movement to the libertarian left gained momentum when the populist 
right, a new party type, succeeded in framing the question of identity and community 
in terms of “us” and “the other”. By putting the issues of immigration and the alleged 
inability of the integration of people with different cultural backgrounds onto the 
political agenda, the populist right has driven a second transformation of the 
dimensions of political conflict in Western European party systems in the 1990s 
(Kriesi et al. 2006). Contrary to classical extreme right parties, the populist right does 
not adhere to racism and does not reject other cultures as such, but advocates an 
“ethnopluralist” ideal of preserving the distinctive traditions of national cultures.  
As a consequence, a new cultural conflict has gained centre stage in Western 
Europe in the 1990s. The one side holds universalistic conceptions of community and 
advocates individual autonomy, the other emphasizes the right to preserve traditional 
communities in which common moral understandings have developed, and that are 
seen as threatened by multicultural society. These opposing positions mirror 
contemporary debates between liberals and communitarians in political philosophy, 
and in their extreme form constitute the poles of a political dimension of conflict that 
runs from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian values. While 
liberal philosophers such as Rawls (1971) emphasise universally binding norms, even 
moderate communitarians like Walzer (1983) are more reluctant to grant abstract 
principles primacy over shared moral understandings within an “organic” community. 
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New Right intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist have popularized and radicalized the 
latter view, and have provided a blueprint for the populist right’s “differentialist 
nativist” discourse, as Betz (2002, 2004) has termed it.  
Apart from their location at the extreme of the ideological dimension running from 
libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions, two further 
attributes can be taken to distinguish extreme right-wing populist parties from other 
parties (Bornschier 2007a). The first is their populist anti-establishment discourse, in 
which they draw a dividing line between themselves and the established parties both of 
the left and right. Secondly, they exhibit a hierarchical internal structure, which sets 
them apart from the pluralist mainstream parties, and which allows a charismatic 
leader to quickly revert the party’s positions in reaction to the changing moods of the 
populace. This organizational feature has enabled right-wing populist parties to rapidly 
cater the immigration theme, as well as to exploit new issues such as European 
integration. Within the wider extreme right party family, the extreme populist right 
represents an ideologically more moderate sub-group, both by virtue of its 
“differentialist nativist” discourse, as well as its explicit adherence to democratic rule. 
This allows right-wing populist parties to portray themselves as the ignored 
mainstream of society.  
 
 
Historical Cleavages, Political Agency, and the Mobilization of  
New Political Divides 
 
Notwithstanding the increasing similarities of right-wing populist parties in terms of 
their discourse, however, their far from uniform success across Western Europe begs 
an explanation. Looking for factors that may account for the highly uneven success of 
these parties, the historical mobilization of cleavages evolving around class and 
religion in fact suggests a straightforward answer: Established cleavages limit the 
space for the mobilization and political manifestation of political potentials and divides 
(Rokkan 2000, Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995, Bartolini 2000). New divides will only 
materialize if the established cleavage structure no longer “organizes” issues cutting 
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across existing lines of division “out of politics”, in Schattschneider’s (1975 [1960]: 
Ch. 4) famous words.  
Applying this perspective to contemporary developments, however, requires a 
conceptual re-assessment of the cleavage approach. While the narrow focus on the 
social structural underpinnings of voting choices in much of the literature on cleavages 
has been criticized early on (Sartori 1968), a new strand of research focusing on the 
role of agency in cleavage formation has emerged only recently (e.g., Enyedi 2005, 
Deegan-Krause 2006). In this paper, I suggest to pay attention to the role of agency 
both in the initial formation of a cleavage, as well as in its subsequent perpetuation. 
Figure 1 illustrates the role of political conflict by showing how it relates to the three 
elements that Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213-220) have conceptualized in their widely 
acclaimed definition of a cleavage.  
With respect to the initial mobilization of social structural divisions or grievances, 
social structural, collective identity, and political organization – the three elements 
emphasized by Bartolini and Mair (1990) – represent a mobilization sequence. A 
shared understanding of group membership is a necessary condition for the emergence 
of a cleavage because individuals will only join together and act on behalf of their 
membership in the group if they share a collective identity that allows them to 
overcome the free-rider problem (Pizzorno 1986, 1991, Melucci 1996). Empirical 
research has provided ample empirical support for this proposition. As Tarrow (1992: 
177) points out, “If the social movement research of the last two decades has shown 
anything, it is that grievances are not sufficient to trigger collective action, that this 
requires someone who can take advantage of political opportunities, develop 
organizations of some kind, and interpret grievances and mobilize consensus around 
them” (emphasis added). Collective identities, in other words, are “produced by the 
social construction of boundaries” (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995: 74). Clearly, then, 
political agency and conflicts between parties play an important role in creating 
cleavages. 
Once cleavages have been established by the presence of political parties that 
articulate the underlying antagonism, the continuance of political conflict plays an 
important role for the long-term fate of the division. Only if the group identifications 
underlying the cleavage are keep alive by ongoing conflicts over conflicting policy 
positions will members of an objective social category remain loyal to the parties that 
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once claimed to act on their behalf. A focus on political conflict allows us to make 
sense of the famous “freezing into place” of European party systems that Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) observed, a process that has remained poorly understood to this day, as 
Mair (2001) has stated. Cleavages remain stable to the degree that the basic 
oppositions they represent continue to shape voters’ understandings and interpretations 
of politics, thereby “organizing out” new issues. New voters are socialized into the 
existing structure of cleavages, and develop cognitive schemas that allow them to 
interpret new issues in terms of basic ideological divisions. They also acquire political 
identities that help them to locate themselves within their schematic representation of 
politics, making it possible to take political decisions with little information at hand. 
Consequently, how much room the established cleavages leave for new conflicts 
therefore depends on the persistence of the collective social and political identities they 
entail.  
 
 
Figure 1: Social structure, collective identities, and their reinforcement  
by parties’ differing policy propositions 
 
A durable pattern of political behaviour of structurally defined groups – a cleavage – 
therefore has its origin in the conflicts resulting from a macro-historical critical 
juncture, but its continued saliency depends on its being kept alive by disagreement 
between key political actors. Conflict has group-binding functions (Coser 1956), and 
collective political identities will therefore gradually become weaker if they are not 
reinforced by political conflict. By the same token, cleavages will no longer be 
transmitted over generations if the division they stand for has lost its relevance, and a 
window of opportunity for new conflicts will emerge on the political stage. 
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Determining the space for new conflicts therefore requires the inclusion of the 
divergence of parties’ policy positions into the study of cleavages. In the next section, 
I develop an empirically quantifiable model that focuses on the interplay of established 
cleavages and new divisions that may or may not alter the dominant patterns of 
oppositions. 
 
Political Conflict and Opportunities for Right-Wing Populist Mobilization 
 
If the premises outlined in the preceding section are correct, then two important factors 
impinge on the chances of challenging parties gaining success. The first factor, in the 
tradition of Bartolini and Mair (1990), as well as Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995), is the 
degree of closure of the social groups divided by a cleavage. The closure of social 
groups is essential because when existing group identifications are strong, mobilization 
efforts along new lines of social division are difficult. The second factor impinging on 
the chances for right-wing populist parties is the opportunity structure resulting from 
the programmatic positions and hence the strategies of the established parties. Where 
the established parties absorb the traditionalist-communitarian potentials that gain 
room as a result of the veining of the traditional cleavages, the populist right will have 
difficulties in entrenching itself. In other words, the responsiveness of the party system 
to the preferences of the electorate is of crucial importance here. Likewise, if the 
established parties keep polarization around the new cultural conflicts low, they may 
be able to contain the manifestation of the traditionalist-communitarian potential, 
while at the same time remaining responsive to their constituencies.  
The aim in this section is to outline a conceptual framework that allows for an 
empirical examination of the content of oppositions in party systems and the strength 
of political alignments that these oppositions entail. I develop a typology of different 
types of divides that have varying consequences for the mobilization of new conflicts. 
The analytical strategy developed provides a general model to assess the chances for 
new political conflicts to gain room, and will be employed in this paper to explain the 
differing fate that right-wing populist parties have faced in France and Germany. 
In order to analyse political conflicts, I use the term line of opposition to denote a 
political conflict that structures party competition in a given election. Through its tight 
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conjunction with the policy level of party competition, it refers to something clearly 
distinct from a cleavage. Such a dividing line can, but does not necessarily exhibit a 
homogeneous social structural base, however defined. First of all, the number of lines 
of opposition does not necessarily coincide with that of the cleavages underlying the 
party system. A cleavage is something we do not necessarily encounter in everyday 
politics: Representing a (durable) pattern of political behaviour of social groups, 
linking them to specific political organizations (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 213-220), it 
cannot be observed without analyzing the social structural basis or the stability of 
political preferences of social groups. In principle, a number of cleavages may be 
present within an electorate, but not every cleavage will find expression in a separate 
line of opposition.  
At the same time, I adhere to the view that the contemporary impact of the 
historical cleavages lies primarily in having shaped party systems in the crucial phase 
of mass enfranchisement and mobilization, which led to their subsequently “freezing”, 
and not so much in the immutability of a cleavage’s social structural basis (Sartori 
1968, Mair 2001, Bornschier 2007a, 2007b). I therefore propose to lay primary 
emphasis on the stability of the links between social groups and parties, and pay less 
attention to the social structural homogeneity of the groups underlying a cleavage. A 
cleavage structure then denotes a durable pattern of political behaviour of socially or 
politically defined groups. In the model presented here, I regard the stability of 
alignments over time as the crucial factor distinguishing short-term alignments from 
cleavages. To the degree that we find durable alignments, it is highly probable that 
they represent a transformed or a new cleavage. Unstable alignments, on the other 
hand, be they structural or not, are either short-term deviations from the established 
patterns of cleavage politics, or a herald of an unfreezing party system.  
 
Different types of divide and resulting mobilization potentials for new conflicts 
 
Starting from the assumption that existing alignments condition the room for new 
conflicts to emerge, different types of cleavage can be differentiated that have variable 
consequences for the mobilization capacity of new conflicts. While some cleavages 
may be at the centre of political disputes, others presumably have a more identitarian 
role, and stabilize alignments because the social groups divided by them (still) share a 
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collective identity. Following Bartolini and Mair (1990: 19-52, 68-95), as well as 
Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995), cleavages can be differentiated along two dimensions, 
namely, salience and closure. Salience denotes the importance of a cleavage relative to 
other divides in a party system, while closure refers to the stability of the social rela-
tionship represented by the cleavage. Together, these elements condition the stability 
of political alignments. A cleavage, according to these authors’ conceptualization, is 
important if it structures party preferences to a high degree and if voters do not change 
allegiances for a party on one side of the cleavage to one belonging to the opposite 
camp.  
From Bartolini and Mair (1990), I retain the notion that the closure of social groups 
opposing one another along a line of cleavage can be analytically grasped by means of 
the stability of partisan alignments. In determining the saliency of a divide, I depart 
from their approach in focusing on the polarization of parties and voters regarding the 
issues around which the conflict evolves, rather than on cross-cleavage volatility. The 
latter says little about how virulent a conflict actually remains. The polarization of the 
party system along a specific divide is thus measured by way of the differences 
between parties’ programmatic statements. If parties’ positions are far apart along a 
line of opposition, it represents a salient dimension within the party system. This 
conception follows from the central role of political conflict in perpetuating cleavage 
structures postulated in the preceding section. 
The next analytical step is to relate oppositions in the party system to the attitudes 
of voters. In determining the chances for a realignment to occur as a consequence of a 
new dimension of conflict, the match between the positions of parties and that of their 
respective electorates is crucial: It allows an estimation of the degree to which the 
party system is responsive to voters. Because the term cleavage has usually been 
reserved for relationships where political parties represent durable oppositions in the 
preferences of social groups, I consider a rough match in the positions of parties and 
their voters as a defining feature of a cleavage. Over the long run, a miss-match 
between the two will presumably lead to an erosion of the link between parties and 
their social constituencies. This leads to a waning of the cleavage and opens space for 
new alignments based on other group attachments.  
This results in an analytical schema combining three elements: (1) The polarization 
of parties’ positions along a line of opposition, indicating the salience of a divide. (2) 
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The match between the positions of parties and their voters along this divide, allowing 
an estimation of the responsiveness of the party system to the preferences of the 
electorate. (3) The degree of closure a division entails in terms of the organizational 
loyalties of social groups. Like Bartolini and Mair (1990), I am not interested in 
partisan loyalties to individual parties, but in the stability of preferences for ideological 
blocks of parties along a divide, which represent the broad divisions reflected in 
voters’ ideological schemas. Stable preferences indicate closure and strongly rooted 
political identities, while unstable preferences are an indication of a fluid line of 
opposition or cleavage. Closure gives an indication of the collective identity 
component of an alignment. If this component is strong, it will delay the manifestation 
of a new opposition even if parties have converged in their positions and if the conflict 
is pacified. Figure 2 shows the possible combinations of these three elements. The 
starting point for analysis is a single dimension that has been found to structure 
political competition in a particular election in a country. The analysis of a number of 
elections can then reveal either dominant patterns or evolutions in the types of divide.  
I now explain the content of the four quadrants and of the individual cells in the 
schema and briefly state what the implications of the various types of alignment are for 
the mobilization capacity of new political oppositions: 
(1) Starting at the top left of Figure 2, we find a situation combining high party 
polarization and a match in positions of parties’ and voters, indicating that voter 
preferences are also polarized. With parties and voters being durably aligned along a 
line of opposition, this corresponds to a highly segmented cleavage, in other words a 
deep-rooted political opposition that entails strong loyalties and party preferences of 
social groups. As a consequence, the electoral market is tightly restrained and leaves 
little room for the emergence of new lines of opposition or new political parties. At the 
extreme, such a structure of opposition rules out any real competition between parties. 
In political systems characterized by pillarization, where the Netherlands at least used 
to be a prominent example, each party has its own constituency, and they do not really 
compete at all. Presumably, therefore, this is the structure of conflict that most strongly 
inhibits the emergence of a new conflict at the centre of the party system. In this 
category we find on the one hand established cleavages that have either preserved their 
salience or have been reinvigorated by new issues, or, on the other hand, highly salient 
new divides that have come to structure politics. 
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Figure 2:  Types of divide as a function of polarization, responsiveness, and 
 social closure 
 
Match Mismatch 
Polarization 
of parties 
Stable 
alignments 
Unstable 
alignments 
Stable 
alignments 
Unstable 
alignments 
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CLEAVAGE 
 
 
 
both parties and 
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durably aligned 
along the 
dimension 
 
 
EMERGING LINE 
OF OPPOSITION 
 
 
 
segmented 
opposition cross-
cutting other 
dimension and 
lacking closure 
 
 
UNRESPONSIVE 
PARTY SYSTEM 
(organizational 
cartellization) 
 
OUT-DATED 
CLEAVAGE 
 
Established 
loyalties check 
emergence of  
new conflicts 
 
UNRESPONSIVE 
PARTY SYSTEM 
(organizational 
cartellization) 
 
OUT-DATED 
CLEAVAGE 
 
Unanchored party 
system: High 
potential for 
realignments or 
anti-cartel parties 
 
low 
 
IDENTITARIAN 
CLEAVAGE  
 
 
 
 
 
Alignments 
stabilized by 
strong political 
identities, 
historically 
formed 
 
COMPETITIVE 
POLITICAL 
DIMENSION / 
SCHUMPETERIAN 
COMPETITION 
 
 
Performance of 
government 
decisive for 
voting choices 
 
 
UNRESPONSIVE 
PARTY SYSTEM 
(Issue-
cartellization) 
 
Possibly a 
NEW DIMENSION  
OF CONFLICT 
 
Identification 
checks emergence 
of new conflicts/ 
realignments 
 
UNRESPONSIVE 
PARTY SYSTEM 
(Issue-
cartellization) 
 
Possibly a 
NEW DIMENSION 
OF CONFLICT 
 
High potential for 
anti-cartel parties/ 
realignments 
 
 
A corresponding case where preferences are volatile, exemplified by the field to the 
right, points to an emerging line of opposition. Competing with other, crosscutting 
divides, it lacks strong partisan loyalties. Voting choices are therefore dependent on 
the relative salience of this line of opposition as opposed to other divides in a given 
election. Should the division prove to be temporary, patterns of party competition will 
not change much. If, however, the conflict remains salient for voters, it is likely to lead 
to realignments resulting in a political structuring and then stabilization of alignments 
along this divide. The driving force of such realignments is either an outsider-party or 
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an established party reorienting itself in order to attract new voters beyond its 
traditional constituency. 
(2) Moving down to the two bottom-left cells, we find a situation where the distances 
both between parties, and between their electorates are low. The first case is that of an 
identitarian cleavage, where party preferences are stable due to strong collective 
identities of social groups that form political sub-cultures. Here, closure remains high 
due to enduring group attachments that carry the imprint of historical conflicts. But 
since the underlying collective identities are not reinforced by contrasting 
programmatic stances of parties, preferences are likely to remain stable only as long as 
new oppositions do not gain in importance relative to the old ones. However, even if 
this happens, and if the new oppositions crosscut existing constituencies, the rise of a 
new line of opposition will at least be tempered or delayed by the force of existing 
loyalties.  
In the right-hand cell of this quadrant, we find a competitive political dimension, 
which is close to Schumpeter’s (1942) characterization of party competition: Elections 
serve to elect competing teams of politicians that try to convince voters in the electoral 
market. In theory, as Downs (1957) has argued, this results in their targeting the 
median voter. In a situation conforming to these criteria, voters can choose among 
parties by virtue of their performance in office. If new potentials were to arise, 
newcomers could in principle find fertile ground, because there is little political 
identification to check the emergence of new conflicts. However, since the established 
parties do not have any strong links to specific constituencies that keep them 
accountable, they are relatively free to re-orient themselves and to absorb new issues, 
limiting the chances for challengers to gain success.  
(3) I now turn to the two cases in the bottom-right corner, where the party system is 
feebly polarized and at the same time fails to represent voters, implying that party 
electorates are characterized by more diverging policy preferences. Leaving aside for a 
moment the third criterion pertaining to the stability of alignments, this can be the case 
in two contrasting situations: Either the established parties have converged along a line 
of opposition and are thus unresponsive to their voters, for whom the dimension 
remains salient. Some would argue this being the case for the state-market dimension 
as a consequence of the move to the centre of Social Democratic parties associated 
with their “Third way” modernization. The other possibility is that the established 
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parties have not (yet) taken clear positions along a new dimension of political conflict. 
Parties can try to avoid doing so for various reasons, for example because they are 
internally divided concerning new issues, as it has been argued in the case of parties’ 
stances towards European integration (Bartolini 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006). In these 
cases, in which parties’ positions do not differ much, while voter preferences are 
polarized, we have evidence for what I propose to call issue-specific cartellization.  
If party alignments are stable, and social closure is high (the left-hand cell in this 
quadrant), existing political identities will retard processes of realignment. But since 
the positions of the established parties are similar, and because no visible conflicts 
over policy reinforce group attachments, existing party loyalties can be expected to 
decline. If this happens, we move to the right-hand cell, where new conflicts are likely 
to gain room. This is probably the most advantageous situation for anti-establishment 
parties to emerge, since they can on the one hand advocate programmatic positions 
that are not represented within the party system, and on the other hand denounce the 
other parties for not being responsive to the preferences of voters. In fact, this 
corresponds to a prominent explanation for the rise of right-wing populist parties in the 
1980s (Katz, Mair 1995, Kitschelt 1995, Ignazi 1992, 2003, Abedi 2002).  
(4) Finally, moving to the top right cells, we find two situations of a mismatch between 
the positions of parties and voters. In both cases, parties’ positions are far apart on the 
dimension, but the party system is unresponsive to the positions of voters, and thus 
reflects an out-dated cleavage. As the preceding two cases in quadrant 3, such 
constellations are supposedly related to Katz and Mair’s (1995) thesis of party system 
cartellization. Situations of cartellization can be differentiated to refer either to the 
established parties keeping specific issues off the agenda, which I have termed issue-
specific cartellization, or to their ability to inhibit the entry of new competitors, partly 
due to their privileged access to state resources. The latter case, which may be termed 
organizational cartellization, is relevant for the two cases of polarized, but 
unresponsive party systems in this quadrant, where the established parties manage to 
restrict competition. Similarly, grass root party members or parties’ clinging to their 
old core constituencies make impossible an ideological moderation. If alignments are 
stable, then the conflict, although pacified on the voter side, still engenders loyalties. 
One cell to the right, a similar situation has already led to a waning of partisan 
attachments: the party system does not reflect voters’ preferences and is unanchored in 
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the electorate. Hence, the emergence of a new line of opposition is possible either due 
to the reorientation of an established party, or to the entry of a new competitor de-
emphasizing the established line of opposition for the benefit of a new one. 
 
 
An Empirical Application of the Model: The New Cultural Conflict and 
the Varying Success of the Populist Right in France and Germany 
  
I now turn to some results from an application of the model just presented. A focus on 
the patterns of opposition prevalent in France and Germany in fact reveals how the 
Front National was able to break into the French party system, while parties of this 
type have remained largely without success in Germany. The theoretical point of 
departure of this analysis lies in the changing nature of cultural conflicts in Western 
Europe. Various studies have shown that the political space in France and Germany, as 
well as in other countries, underwent a dual transformation between the 1970s and the 
1990s, first under the impact of the mobilization of the New Left, and then as a 
consequence of a counter-mobilization of the populist right (Kriesi et al. 2006, 
Bornschier 2005, 2008, Dolezal 2008a). Based on an analysis of the policy statements 
of political parties in election campaigns, these studies empirically identify a two-
dimensional pattern of opposition that now characterizes political competition in 
Western Europe. The first dimension of conflict is characterized by the antagonism 
between economic liberalism and support for the welfare state, corresponding to the 
political manifestation of the traditional class cleavage. The second dimension 
involves cultural issues. As a consequence of the mobilization of the New Social 
Movements of the 1960s and 1970s, issues relating to cultural liberalism have 
polarized parties already in the 1970s. This category includes support for the 
universalistic goals of the New Social Movements such as peace, gender equality, 
human rights, as well as issues such as support for cultural diversity, international 
cooperation, support for the right to abortion, and opposition against patriotism, the 
defence of tradition and national sovereignty, and traditional moral values. 
In the 1970s, the counter-pole to cultural liberalism is formed by budgetary rigor, 
calls for law and order, or support for the army, all of which can be interpreted to 
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represent a neo-conservative counter-pole to cultural liberalism. In the more recent 
elections, a common cultural dimension of conflict has emerged, whose poles are 
constituted by cultural liberalism on the one hand, and anti-immigration stances on the 
other. These two categories embody the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian line of conflict. Cultural liberalism conveys both support for 
universalistic values, as well as the repudiation of the opposing normative ideals, 
namely, the defence of tradition, national sovereignty, and traditional moral values. 
Opposition to immigration and calls for a tough integration policy, on the other hand, 
have been used by the populist right in its attempt at constructing a collective identity 
that is based on the demarcation from people with cultural backgrounds that differ 
from that of the majority population. 
In the empirical application of the model, I take the existence of a two-dimensional 
political space that is characterized by these two dimensions as given. The further 
analysis focuses on the way the established parties have dealt with the issues relating 
to the older state-market cleavage and those associated with the new cultural divide, 
and how their differing strategies have opened the way for the emergence of a strong 
right-wing populist challenger in France, but not in Germany. More specifically, if the 
structure of political space is similar in the two countries, then two factors may 
account for the differential success of the populist right. First of all, the state-market 
may have remained more salient in Germany than in France, and could have prevented 
realignments based on voter preferences concerning the new cultural issues. In other 
words, the continuing polarization of parties and voters along the economic divide may 
have prevented the emergence of a party with a decidedly traditionalist-communitarian 
profile by “organizing out” the corresponding political issues. A second explanation 
for the lack of success of the populist right lies in the differing strategies of political 
parties in dealing with issues related to multiculturalism and universalistic norms.  
In the following, I explain how the analytical model developed in the preceding 
section is operationalized. For reasons of space, this discussion is necessarily brief, and 
the reader interested in the details of the procedures is referred to Bornschier (2007a). I 
then present some aggregate results concerning the nature of oppositions in the two 
countries, employing the typology set out in Figure 2. Finally, a closer look is taken at 
the strategies that the established parties pursued in election campaigns in the 1970s 
and since the late 1980s.  
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The empirical implementation of the analytical model 
 
The first step in the analysis is to measure the positions of parties along each of the 
two divides that structure oppositions in the two countries. To determine the positions 
of parties along the economic and the cultural divides, I rely on data based on the 
media coverage of election campaigns. Because I assume that voters’ political 
identities are reinforced by conflict between parties, this data has the advantage of 
tapping parties’ policy positions regarding those conflicts that were actually fought out 
during election campaigns. The data has been collected within the research project 
“National political change in a denationalizing world” (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, 
Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey 2006), and is based on a sentence by sentence coding of 
party positions as reported in the newspaper coverage of election campaigns (for more 
details on the data, see Kriesi et al. 2006 and Dolezal 2008b). The data covers one 
election in the 1970s and three more recent elections that took place between the late 
1980s and early 2000s. Parties’ policy-related statements were coded in the two 
months preceding each election. The election in the 1970s corresponds to a situation in 
which the first transformation of the traditional political space has taken place under 
the mobilization of the New Left. The second transformation, driven by the issues 
relating to immigration and cultural protectionism, is traced in the three more recent 
contests.  
Party positions along the economic dimension are calculated as the mean of their 
stances with respect to support for the welfare state and economic liberalism 
throughout the time period under consideration. Positions along the cultural 
dimension, on the other hand, are calculated differently in the 1970s and the later 
contests. In the 1970s, the cultural dimension is stamped by cultural liberalism and 
budgetary rigor, in both countries, and additionally by support for the army in 
Germany (Bornschier 2007a), and parties’ position is calculated by the mean of their 
position regarding these issue categories.1 From the late 1980s on, party positions 
along the cultural dimension are expressed by their mean position with respect to 
cultural liberalism and immigration policy.  
                                                
1  The mean is weighted by the relative salience of the issue, which gives the more important issues 
more weight in determining the positions of parties. Tables containing the issue-positions of parties 
and the salience of the issues in the two countries are available online: 
http://www.ipz.uzh.ch/forschung/lsforschung/npw/tables.html.  
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As an indicator of the overall degree of polarization a divide entails in a particular 
election, which is necessary to implement the model developed in the preceding 
section, the standard deviations of parties’ positions is a straightforward solution. In 
order to measure the match between the positions of parties and their electorates, the 
dimensions found to structure the supply side of party competition are reconstructed 
on the voter side using survey data. Most of the issue categories can be operationalized 
using demand side data, and I use principal component factor analysis to combine the 
various survey items that correspond to the categories into an index. The survey items 
used and their assignment to the categories employed in the analysis of party positions 
are found in the Appendix. The mean positions of parties and voters cannot be 
compared directly, because they have been measured on different scales, but it is 
possible to assess the congruence of representation by calculating the correlation 
between positions. Because this taps only the covariance between positions, the 
differing scales are not a problem.  
To measure the stability of alignments, I use recall questions from the surveys to 
identify the share of voters who loyally turn out to vote for a party belonging to the 
same ideological block. Abstention from voting, in other words, is taken as a possible 
antecedent to a reconfiguration of preferences. Concerning the economic divide, two 
ideological blocks can be defined based on the sides they take with regard to the 
traditional class cleavage. This criterion is more difficult to apply in the case of some 
more recently formed parties, namely the Ecologists and those of the populist New 
Right. However, the Ecologists in both countries clearly lean to the left in their 
economic posture and the Front National, does, overall, lean more to the right in this 
respect. The assignment of these parties to the left and right blocks formed by the 
state-market cleavage is therefore rather unambiguous (see Table 1). 
The identification of the relevant blocks along the cultural dimension is more 
difficult, because we do not have established criteria such as those relating to the class 
cleavage as a starting point. From the theoretical point of view, we can expect up to 
four blocks along the cultural divide: (1) New Left parties, (2) the classical parties of 
the left, (3) those of the established right, and (4) New Right parties, represented by 
the populist right. The distinguishing criterion of the two more recent party families is 
that they take extreme positions at the respective poles of the new cultural dimension 
of conflict, while they have a rather indeterminate position with regard to economic 
conflicts (Bornschier 2007a). Empirically, not all of these blocks may be discernible in 
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every country. Furthermore, the distinction between Old Left and New Left is not 
necessarily an easy one, since New Left parties can either be newly founded parties 
such as the Ecologists, or result from the transformation of an older Socialist party. To 
define the blocks, I therefore use the empirically discerned distances between parties’ 
and voters’ positions along the cultural dimension (for examples, see Figures 6 and 7). 
Large gaps between mean positions and low levels of overlap indicate a segmentation 
of competition. Table 1 shows the ideological blocks identified in the analysis of the 
two countries. In Germany, the patterns of opposition in the 1970s do not reveal 
clearly discernible ideological blocks, and the analysis therefore begins in the 1990s.  
 
Table 1: Ideological blocks along the economic and cultural dimensions of conflict in 
France and Germany 
 State-Market-Cleavage Cultural divide 
France Left: Extreme left, Communists (PCF), New Left: Extreme left, Communists  
1978-2002  Socialists (PSF), Ecologists, Left-wing   (PCF), Socialists (PSF), 
  Radicals (MRG)  Ecologists, MRG 
 Right: Union for French Democracy (UDF), Centre-right: Union for French 
  Gaullists (RPR), Front National  Democracy (UDF), Gaullists (RPR) 
   New Right: Front National 
Germany Left: Social Democrats (SPD), Ecologists, New Left: Ecologists 
1994-2002  Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)  Old Left: Social Democrats (SPD),  
 Right: Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)   Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) 
  Free Democrats (FDP) Centre-Right: Christian Democrats 
    (CDU/CSU), Free Democrats (FDP) 
 
 
 
The overall nature of economic and cultural oppositions in France and Germany 
 
Leaving aside for a moment the stability of alignments, Figure 3 shows the nature of 
economic conflicts in France and Germany in one election in the mid-1970s and three 
more recent elections. For ease of representation, only the first two elements of the 
model are shown, namely, the polarization of the party system and the match between 
the positions of parties and their electorates, which indicates the responsiveness of the 
party system to voter preferences. The resulting four quadrants correspond to four 
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basic types of divide, each of which is further differentiated in the full model 
according to the stability of alignments that the line of conflict entails (see Figure 2). 
The grey lines indicate (admittedly arbitrary) cut-off points for the classification which 
are, however, only used as rules of thumb.  
 
 
Figure 3: Patterns of opposition along the state-market cleavage 
in France and Germany 
 
While there are elections that exhibit a somewhat lower match between the positions 
of parties and their voters, the state-market cleavage represents an identitarian divide 
in most elections in the two countries by virtue of medium to low levels of polarization 
and rather responsive party systems. While voter loyalties to the ideological party 
blocks defined by the state-market cleavage continue to be rather strong in both 
countries (see Figure 4), economic conflicts already in the 1970s have therefore not 
been very strongly reinforced by political conflict, and the situation is similar one or 
two decades later. Given the state interventionist conviction of the French left, this 
may come unexpected, but it becomes plausible if we take into account that the posture 
of the parties of the right is a far cry from being market-liberal. The state-market 
cleavage in both Germany and France is thus kept alive by the relatively strong 
political identities associated with it, rather than by segmented patterns of opposition.  
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For those parts of the electorate that do not have strong allegiances to the left and 
right economic blocks, however, the economic divide is likely to have evolved into a 
competitive political dimension, where the performance of governments is decisive for 
voting decisions. In the long run, as established political identities fade, this is what we 
would expect for the entire electorate. In France, an overall decline in the stability of 
alignments to these blocks has been witnessed since the 1970s, while they have 
remained rather stable in Germany. Loyalties related to the state-market cleavage have 
thus delayed, but not organized out completely the rising prominence of political 
identities related to the new cultural divide. 
 
 
Figure 4: Stability of alignments along the economic and cultural dimensions 
(measured as the percentage of voters who chose a party from the same 
ideological block in two consecutive elections) 
 
While the nature of oppositions is thus quite similar along the economic dimension in 
the two countries, patterns of conflict differ much more strongly with respect to the 
cultural dimension, as Figure 5 reveals. In France, the party system has become more 
segmented along the new cultural line of conflict than along the economic divide. 
While alignments were still structured by the religious and class cleavages in the 
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1970s, the manifestation of the left-libertarian agenda in party competition first led to a 
loss of responsiveness of the party system, and then to a reconfiguration of partisan 
alignments and parties’ political offer. By the late 1980s, under the impact of the 
mobilization of the populist right, a three-block structure has emerged in which the 
poles are constituted by the left-libertarian and the traditionalist-communitarian 
blocks, with the centre right squeezed in the middle, as we shall see later. At the end of 
this process of party system transformation, parties closely mirror the positions of the 
electorate. The Front National is an integral part of this segmented pattern of 
oppositions in France, as we shall see later on. How, then, could a similar 
transformation of political space have so different consequences with respect to the 
resulting configuration of the party system? The next section analyses the strategies of 
the established parties in dealing with the new cultural issues that have shaped political 
controversy since the 1970s. 
 
 
Figure 5: Patterns of opposition along the cultural divide in France, 
Switzerland, and Germany 
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The strategies of the mainstream parties and the space for the populist right in France  
 
France is one of the prime examples that corroborates Ignazi’s (1992, 2003) influential 
claim that the established parties of the right pushed a radicalization of political 
discourse which right-wing populist parties later thrived on. This occurred first in 
1977, when the right-wing government announced plans to repatriate immigrants, 
countering first successes of the left in the wake of its ascendance to power, and 
confronted with rising levels of unemployment. This provoked a counter-mobilization 
of the unions and the non-communist left, as well as by parts of the right, leading the 
government to abandon the plan (Martin 2000: 256ff.). Nonetheless, as Figure 6 
shows, with the exception of the Gaullist RPR, the mainstream parties did not differ 
strongly with respect to their position on the cultural dimension in the 1978 
parliamentary election. In this and the following figures, a position to the left indicates 
a libertarian-universalistic stance, while a position to the right denotes a defence of 
tradition as against these universalistic principles. The party names corresponding to 
the abbreviations can be found in Table 1. 
 
 
 
1978: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (5 parties): 0.29 
polarization parties: 0.21 
 
 
 
 
 
1988: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (5 parties): 0.98 
polarization parties: 0.73 | without FN: 0.54 
 
Figure 6: Parties and voters on the cultural divide in France, 1978-2002 
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The established right played with ideological polarization again after it found itself 
in opposition after 1981. When the Socialist government under Mitterrand decided to 
regularize illicit immigrants and abandon the death penalty, the right reacted promptly 
and radicalized its discourse to oppose these measures. On the other hand, the Socialist 
left faced difficulties with respect to economic policy making, and was soon forced to 
abandon its ambitious plan at stabilizing the economy using Keynesian demand 
stimulation. Confronted with the early successes of the Front National, it promoted 
anti-racism as a central issue to fill its ideological void, as Perrineau (1997: 49-50) 
states, defending a multiculturalist “recognition of difference”. This strategy is likely 
to have contributed to the rising salience of the cultural as opposed to the economic 
dimension of conflict. Furthermore, it reinforced the Front National’s ownership of the 
immigration issue (see also Meguid 2005).  
The result of the strategy of the left in conjuncture with the rise of the Front 
National is mirrored in the evolution of the patterns of opposition between 1978 and 
1988, which are visible in the positions of parties and voters in Figure 6. In the 1978 
election, only the RPR pursued a polarizing strategy by issuing more traditionalist 
stances, while a number of parties fail to represent their voters adequately, most 
prominently the centre-right UDF. Overall, there is a very low match in positions on 
the supply side and on the demand side, as indicated beneath each of the graphs. In 
other words, the party system is clearly unresponsive to the electorate.2  
In the 1988 campaign, this situation has changed dramatically. The results presented 
in Figure 6 underline the polarizing strategy of the Socialists and the Communists, 
which is expressed in their move towards the libertarian-universalistic pole on the 
divide. From 1988 on, a traditionalist position to the right of the figure is coupled with 
exclusionist stances regarding foreigners. With the Front National catering the 
opposing traditionalist-communitarian pole of the divide, polarization surges between 
1978 and 1988. While the RPR has not changed its position very much, the UDF now 
lies at quite a distance from the parties of the left, resulting in a programmatic 
convergence of the established right. However, this has not averted the rapid erosion of 
the UDF’s support base. The most important finding is that the Front National 
mobilizes an electorate whose location is similarly extreme to the party itself. 
                                                
2  The Front National’s position cannot be determined in 1978 due to an insufficient number of 
statements in the media. The position of its voters, on the other hand, is very dispersed along the 
cultural dimension, resulting in a centrist average position. It thus seems as if the party did not 
primarily mobilize on this dimension at the beginning of its rise. 
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Although there is some overlap between relatively traditionalist supporters of the RPR 
and the less traditionalist followers of the Front National, a large number of the latter’s 
voters are located at the extreme of the dimension (the bars beneath the average 
positions show the standard deviation of party statements and voter orientations). The 
relatively large spread of the RPR’s issue statements underlines the party’s difficulty 
in defining its position on the cultural dimension, and its voters are also more 
dispersed along the spectrum than those of the Front National.  
While the electorates have also become more polarized than in the 1970s due to the 
mobilizing efforts of the parties, it is the strong increase in polarization of the party 
system that restores the responsiveness of the party system, indicated by a close match 
in the positions of parties and voters. Overall, we face a situation of deep segmentation 
of which the Front National is an integral part: The party system is responsive with or 
without the Front National and its voters. Both the party and its voters – which 
represent roughly a sixth of the electorate – lie at the extremes on the cultural divide 
and strongly contribute to the segmented nature of opposition on this axis, which was 
already revealed in Figure 5. This basic pattern is reproduced in the 1995 and 2002 
elections, which are not shown in the figure for reasons of space. 
 
No space for the populist right in Germany? 
 
How dis the strategies of the established parties in Germany differ from those of their 
counterparts in France? Since World War II, the two Christian Democrat sister parties 
have proven a remarkable capacity of integrating the entire right-wing spectrum. Smith 
(1976), in discussing Germany’s “restricted ideological space”, points out that “The 
early ability of the CDU to spread itself across the previously rigid lines of German 
society led to the assimilation of a large proportion of the electorate within a single 
umbrella-party” (1976: 402). Until today, it is widely held that the extreme right’s 
marginality is due to the ability of the established right to take up the latter’s issues, to 
occupy its positions in a more moderate and acceptable way, and to thereby integrate 
potential supporters of extreme right-wing parties (Minkenberg 1997: 155, Jaschke 
1999: 141-2, Niedermayer 2006: 119, Dolezal 2008a). In the following brief sketch, I 
wish to show that the established right first failed to respond adequately to the 
challenge resulting from the rise of the New Left, resulting in the emergence of the 
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Republikaner party in 1983, followed by a number of electoral surges. However, 
German unification and the immigration issue provided the Christian Democrats with 
an opportunity to regain credibility among traditionalist-communitarian voters, thereby 
again restricting the political space available for the extreme right.  
Germany witnessed a “renaissance of conservatism” in the 1970s as a reaction to 
the 1968 student movement and to the formation of a social-liberal government after 
the 1972 election, which performed a policy shift regarding the communist countries in 
the east (the so-called “Ostpolitik”). Confronted with the decline of religiosity and a 
programmatic vacuum, the Union parties endorsed the Zeitgeist by stressing the 
importance of the family for moral guidance, and by propagating a new historical and 
national consciousness (Grande 1988). As Figure 7 shows, the positions of the mayor 
parties and of their voters were much more polarized in the 1976 election in Germany 
than was the case in the late 1970s in France. The Social Democrat SPD and the FDP, 
their Liberal coalition partner, have strongly endorsed the universalistic norms of the 
New Social Movements, and the SPD thus has a clear New Left profile. The position 
of the CDU and CSU, the Christian Democrat sister parties, on the other hand, reflects 
their neo-conservative profile. As indicated by the match between political supply and 
demand, the party system represents voter preferences almost perfectly, and a two-
block structure is clearly discernible at both levels. It has to be kept in mind, however, 
that the 1976 election represents a situation in which the immigration issue had not yet 
appeared on the political agenda. Furthermore, the rather rightist position of non-voters 
suggests a political potential not absorbed by the Christian Democrats.  
The new conservative-liberal coalition that took office in 1982 had announced a 
moral and intellectual renewal (“geistig-moralische Wende”), which can be interpreted 
as a neo-conservative counterpart to the New Left political agenda. Even if patriotism 
symbolically made come-back under Kohl’s chancellorship, the Union parties failed to 
perform the promised “turn” in terms of concrete policies, however (Ignazi 2003: 74-5, 
Grande 1988: 69). This was one of the mayor reasons provoking the breakaway of the 
extreme right Republikaner from their Bavarian Christian Democrat mother party. The 
founding of the Republikaner party is widely held to have resulted from the space 
created by the Union parties’ failure to fulfil their promises, which in turn was due to 
tensions between competing factions within the party (Minkenberg 1992: 70-2, Grande 
1988: 70-1, Ignazi 2003: 75).  
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1976: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.96 
polarization parties: 0.62 
 
 
 
 
1994: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (3 parties): 0.94 
polarization parties: 0.12 
 
 
 
 
1998: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.8 
polarization parties: 0.55 
 
Figure 7: Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Germany, 1976-1998 
 
In other words, the Union parties, as a party with a pluralist and democratic internal 
structure, showed difficulties in absorbing the traditionalist political potential that 
resulted from the mobilization of the New Left. The odds for such a strategy improved, 
however, with the rise of two new issues on the political agenda. For one thing, the 
Union orchestrated the re-unification of the country under Helmut Kohl’s leadership 
and thereby deprived the extreme right of one of its central themes of the post-war 
decades (Stöss 2005: 38-40, 86). For another, the CSU and parts of the CDU took up 
the immigration issue already in the early 1980s. A few weeks before the fall of the 
social-liberal coalition, CDU leader Helmut Kohl demanded the reduction of the 
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number of foreigners in Germany, and the CSU continued to campaign against 
refugees (Thränhardt 1995, Schmidtke 2004).  
Obviously, then, the established right pursued a similar strategy to that of its 
counter-part in France in the early 1980s. The crucial difference, however, lies in the 
reaction of the left. Using Meguid’s terms (2005), the Socialists in France pursued an 
“adversarial strategy” regarding traditionalist-communitarian issues, making multi-
culturalism a central claim, while the SPD employed a “dismissive strategy” by 
systematically downplaying the immigration question. In retrospect, Helmut Schmidt 
explained that the SPD in 1980 had decided not to ask for local voting rights for 
foreigners because this went “against the instincts of our core electorate”, namely, their 
blue-collar constituency (Thränhardt 1995: 327, Schmidtke 2004: 166-7). In the early 
1990s, the SPD again avoided a stretching of the ideological space. When Germany 
was confronted with large numbers of migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and 
former Yugoslavia, spurring a wave of extreme right activism and violence, the Union 
parties, then in government, reacted promptly. They modified the constitution to allow 
for a far more restrictive immigration policy. The Union parties argued that the 
“threshold of tolerance” and of the capacity to assimilate foreigners had been reached, 
and succeeded in forcing the SPD into the so-called “asylum compromise” (Schmidke 
2004: 169). The resolute reaction of the Union and the agreement of the SPD to the 
new asylum law ousted the issue from the political agenda.  
The integration of foreigners became a more polarizing issue in 1999 when the red-
green coalition announced to reform Germany’s nationality law and attempted to allow 
the dual nationality for long-standing foreign residents and their children. In response, 
the Union parties launched a large debate on national identity, the CDU’s 
parliamentary leader Friedrich Merz demanding that immigrants must conform to 
Germany’s “guiding culture” (“Leitkultur”). As a consequence, the new nationality 
law was drafted in close collaboration with the opposition, because the government 
wanted to keep the issue out of partisan politics. In the event, the proposition was 
watered down considerably.  
The positions of parties and voters presented in Figure 7 show a clear break 
between the situation in the mid-1970s and the three more recent contests, where the 
old contrast is no longer present. The most striking feature of the new pattern is that 
the two major parties, the SPD and the CDU, no longer take strongly opposing 
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positions, and that the same holds true for their electorates. In the 1994 contest, a year 
after the new immigration law took effect, the SPD and CDU lie very close to one 
another, a finding confirmed in the later elections. Together, the major parties lie 
closer to the libertarian-universalistic pole in 1994, move to the centre of the spectrum 
in 1998, and then move back to the left in 2002 (the basic pattern of oppositions 
remains similar in 2002 and is therefore not shown in Figure 7 for reasons of space). In 
the 1994 election, newspapers very much focused on the three traditional German 
parties, and we cannot place the smaller actors, which tend to take much more extreme 
positions in the later contests.  
A new pattern of opposition has thus emerged, which is characterized by similar 
political stances of the SPD and Union parties, while the smaller parties occupy the 
universalistic space to the left of the SPD, which the latter has abandoned since the 
mid-1970s. This pattern mirrors the distribution of preferences on the voter side. 
Except for 1998, where the figure for match barely reaches the level indicating 
congruent representation, the correlation between the positions of parties and those of 
their voters is very high, indicating that the party system is responsive to voter 
preferences. While large parts of the electorate are thus bound into an alliance with 
two major centrist parties, the forefront of the New Left is mobilized by the Ecologists, 
whose voters consistently lie at the universalistic pole of the divide. This implies an 
imbalance in the party system, since there is no counter-pole to the Ecologists 
mobilizing voters at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the preference 
distribution. A potential for differentiation would exist on the right, however. Since the 
centre of the axis halves the distribution of respondents, and many voters therefore 
clearly lie to the right of the average CDU/CSU voter. 
However, apart from the small group of extreme right followers, these voters do not 
seem inclined to support new or anti-establishment political parties. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that those who voted for the Republikaner in 1994 do not appear 
more extreme than Christian Democrat voters at all. This could indicate that a 
considerable share of them were protest voters, as Westle and Niedermayer (1992) 
have suspected, while Falter (1994) has found evidence that these voters in fact hold 
extremist world-views. With the data used here, however, reliable conclusions are 
precluded by the extremely limited number of Republikaner voters in the sample 
(N=9). In the two more recent elections, where there are more respondents, the 
situation is different. Here, the voters of the Republikaner, the NPD, and the DVU are 
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subsumed under the (unreformed) extreme right label, and this electorate is clearly 
situated at the extreme of the cultural dimension. As we would expect, they express 
fierce opposition both against immigration and cultural liberalism. At the same time, 
these parties are unable to mobilize voters beyond their core constituency of hard-line 
authoritarians.  
To explain the absence of success of a right-wing populist challenger in Germany, 
the established parties’ handling of the immigration issue appears most relevant, apart 
from the stigmatization that is associated with supporting parties that appear as right-
wing extremist. By and large, the established parties have kept the immigration issue 
off the political agenda after the reform of the immigration law, containing its saliency. 
To a large degree, voters with traditionalist-communitarian world-views vote for the 
Union parties. However, it does not seem that the Union parties permanently mobilize 
the traditionalist-communitarian potential by virtue of their extreme position, but 
rather that this potential most of the time remains latent and does not manifest itself 
politically. This, in turn, is only possible because of the collusive strategy the major 
parties of the left and right generally pursue, combined with the Union’s moving to the 
right whenever the immigration issue actually surfaces in the public debate. As the 
bars indicating the standard deviation of voter preferences shows, the electorates of the 
SPD and Union parties are characterized by similar degrees of heterogeneity and 
overlap to some degree. Only the Ecologists consistently mobilize an markedly 
universalistic-minded electorate and thus escape the centripetal dynamic. To a more 
limited degree, the same holds true for the post-socialist PDS, but in the elections 
under study here, this remains a phenomenon confined to Eastern Germany.  
The centripetal nature of competition between the major parties of the left and right 
along the cultural divide helps to explain the limited success of parties attempting to 
mobilize a similar clientele as right-wing populist parties do in other countries. By 
leaving the libertarian-universalistic spectrum to the Ecologists, the Social Democrat 
party has abandoned the New Left conviction it displayed in the 1970s and has moved 
to a more orthodox “Old Left” position. Although these loyalties are in decline, blue-
collar workers, which together with those who have low levels of formal education 
represent the core clientele of right-wing populist parties in other countries, have 
remained more faithful to the Social Democratic left in Germany than elsewhere 
(Pappi, Mnich 1992, Pappi 2002). And this is the case despite the fact that skilled and 
unskilled workers as well as citizens with little formal education have developed 
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relatively anti-universalistic and anti-immigrant orientations since the 1970s to a 
similar degree in Germany as in other Western European countries (see Kriesi et al. 
2008 and in particular Dolezal 2008a). It is quite plausible that the SPD has prevented 
the alienation of this electorate as a consequence of its centrist stances regarding the 
conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian concep-
tions of community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to develop a model that can explain first, the emergence of new 
divisions – that may eventually consolidate into cleavages – and secondly, why new 
conflicts result in the entry of new parties into the political arena some cases and not in 
others. This implies paying attention to how firmly electorates are anchored in the 
older divisions that have brought Western European party systems into being, which is 
the central focus of the cleavage approach, as well as to the varying strategies the 
established parties may employ. First of all, whether or not the established parties 
continue to take conflicting positions with respect to the older cleavages has important 
implications for the chances for new divisions to manifest themselves in politics. 
Secondly, the strategies of the established parties may differ with respect to new, 
potentially dividing issues that shape the political agenda due to the mobilization of 
social movements or of new parties seeking to redraw the lines of conflict structuring 
the party system. The analytical strategy developed in this paper encompasses both of 
these aspects. And as the application of the model to France and Germany has shown, 
these factors indeed impinge on the way the new cultural conflict between libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian has manifested itself in political life, 
and on the transformation of the party system that this has resulted in. 
Both in France, as well as in Germany, the force of the traditional class and 
religious cleavages has declined. Despite exhibiting rather low levels of polarization 
on the party and on the voter side, however, the state-market cleavage still entails 
rather strong partisan loyalties that retard the manifestation of new political potentials, 
especially in Germany. While the issues related to the state-market opposition continue 
to play an important role in election campaigns, it has been the waning of the religious 
cleavage that has paved the way for the emergence of a new cultural divide across 
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Western Europe. While the libertarian-authoritarian antagonism characteristic of the 
1970s was still reminiscent of the issues related to the religious cleavage, the meaning 
of the cultural divide has been transformed by the advent of the issue of community on 
the political agenda. As a result of new issues related to immigration and multicultur-
alism, a transformed line of opposition has taken shape throughout Western Europe. 
The nature of this conflict differs in the various countries, however, and whether or 
not a right-wing populist party has been able to assert itself impinges heavily on the 
pattern of oppositions prevalent in the party system. In France, as in other countries in 
which the populist right has made its breakthrough in the 1990s, the segmented pattern 
of oppositions along the cultural line of opposition suggests that the phase of 
realignment has come to an end, and that the new division has consolidated into an 
enduring cleavage. The Front National commands the highest loyalties of all 
ideological blocks along the cultural dimension. Given the strength the populist right 
has reached, it is rather improbable that disputes over the proper definition of binding 
norms, over what constitutes the basis of the national community, and over the 
challenge posed to national sovereignty by European unification should recede all too 
soon. Political conflict will therefore reinforce the collective political identities 
underlying the antagonism between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-
communitarian values. For those who have been socialized into the new structure of 
conflicts, cognitive representations of politics centre on cultural, and not economic 
antagonisms. Considerable parts of the Front National’s electorate acclaim Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s statement that the terms of left and right have become meaningless and that 
the real antagonism has to do with identity.  
In Germany, on the other hand, oppositions along the cultural divide have oscillated 
between a segmented and an identitarian cleavage since the 1970s, facilitating the 
containment of the extreme right potential. The Social Democrats’ abandonment of the 
decidedly libertarian-universalistic position they had held in the 1970s, together with 
the Christian Democrats’ ability to crown out their occasional right-wing populist 
competitors has resulted in a rather centripetal pattern of oppositions in Germany. 
Because the Christian Democrat Union parties have retained the ownership of the 
issues related to traditionalism and immigration, and have the continuing ability to 
rally voters holding traditionalist-communitarian preferences, the structural potentials 
related to the new cultural conflict manifest themselves in tempered form. Contrary to 
earlier studies, the analysis has revealed that the most important factor impinging on 
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the fortune of the populist right in Germany lies in the moderate position of the 
mainstream left. While the Social Democrats’ abandonment of their libertarian-
universalistic stance has spurred the support for what has become one of the most 
successful Ecologist parties in Europe, this has also resulted in a centripetal pattern of 
competition between the two major parties that has prevented a segmentation of party 
and voter positions along the cultural divide. 
Similarly to France, however, it is not the strength of the state-market cleavage that 
precludes a stronger polarization along the cultural line of conflict. In fact, competition 
along the economic cleavage in the two countries most of the time is characterized by 
what I have termed an identitarian opposition, where the loyalties of voters, rather than 
ongoing political conflict stabilize alignments. The absence of a right-wing populist 
party in Germany thus depends on the continuing ability of the major parties of the left 
and right in keeping issues related to immigration out of politics and on the capacity of 
the Christian Democrats to cater the issue should it force its way on the agenda. The 
dominance of the Christian Democrats in the right-wing spectrum gives them 
considerable leeway to shift their positions when new issues emerge and to take 
pronounced stances without risking to lose to a more centre-right competitor. The 
situation in France in the 1970s was quite different in this respect (see Bornschier 
2008). Competition within the right and the Gaullists’ attempt to displace the centre-
right UDF as the dominant party of the right put the issues of national sovereignty on 
the agenda for the first time, and the Gaullists are now haunted by a ghost they had 
helped to bring to birth. 
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Appendix A: Datasets Used for Demand Side Analyses 
 
France 
1978: Enquête post-électorale française, 1978 (q0062) 
1988: Enquête post-électorale française, 1988 (q0601) 
1995: Enquête post-électorale française, 1995 (q0891) 
2002: Panel électoral français 2002 (PEF 2002) 
 
Germany 
1976: Wahlstudie 1976 (ZA0823) 
1994: Nachwahlstudie 1994 (ZA 2601) 
1998: Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten 
Deutschland 1998 (ZA 3066) 
2002: Bundestagswahlstudie 2002 (ZA 3861) 
 
Appendix B: Issue Categories and Indicators Used for Demand Side Analyses 
 
Table A.1:  Relevant issue-categories per election and those operationalized on  
 the demand side, France and Germany 
 Economic dimension Cultural dimension 
France 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Budget  
1978 X X X – 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr  
1988 X X 2 dim. X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr  
1995 – 2 dim. X X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr  
2002 – X X X 
 
Germany 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Budget Army  
1976 X X X – – 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigration 
1994 X X X X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigration 
1998 – X X X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigration 
2002 – X X X 
 
Note:  X denotes that the category can be operationalized and that a single dimension results from the 
factor analysis. In two cases, the solution is two-dimensional (“2 dim.”), and both underlying 
variables are used for the construction of the axis. See Bornschier (2007a) for a detailed 
explanation of this procedure. 
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Table A.2: Indicators used for the operationalization of issue-categories on the demand side in France  
 
1978 
var description category 
t26 supprimer avantages pour réduire inégalités sociales welfare 
t27 élargir le secteur nationalisé ecolib 
t29 limiter augmentation du niveau de vie pour lutter contre l’inflation ecolib 
t30 interdire les licenciements ecolib 
t71 supprimer le droit de grève ? ecolib 
t64 fier d’être français ? cultlib 
t73 pouvoir prendre la pilule avant la majorité ? cultlib 
t77 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique ? cultlib 
t87 envoyer les enfants au catéchisme cultlib 
 
1988 
var description category 
q1a6 Salaires égaux: n’encouragent pas à travailler ecolib 
q4 Difficultés économiques: Etat doit-il contrôler entreprises ? ecolib 
q31a2 Etat : devrait garantir revenu minimum welfare 
q31a9 Rétablir impôt sur grandes fortunes welfare 
q2a1 Couple non marié : condamnable ? trad. values 
q2a2 Avortement : condamnable ? trad. values 
q2a3 Infidélité : condamnable ? trad. values 
q2a4 Homosexualité : condamnable ? trad. values 
q31a6 Femme : faite pour élever les enfants ? trad. values 
q31a7 Société : il faut une hiérarchie cultlib 
q10 Rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique ? cultlib 
q1a4 Fier d’être français cultlib 
q31a5 Juifs ont trop de pouvoir en France cultlib 
q31a8 Normal que les musulmans en France aient des mosquées cultlib 
q1a9 Trop d’immigrés en France immigration 
q31a3 On ne se sent plus chez soi comme avant immigration 
 
1995 
var description category 
q36 priorité: compétitivité ou situation des salaries ecolib 
q20a2 l’Etat intervient-il trop ou pas assez dans la vie économique ecolib 
q7a1 trop d’immigrés en France immigration 
q7a6 on ne se sent plus chez soi comme avant immigration 
q7a3 homosexualité est acceptable cultlib 
q7a5 normal que les musulmans en France aient des mosquées cultlib 
q7a7 normal qu’une femme puisse avorter cultlib 
q22a1 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique cultlib 
q20a1 rôle de la femme (à la maison ou même rôle que hommes) cultlib 
Positive/negative feelings: 
var description category 
q21a4 compétition ecolib 
q21a5 profit ecolib 
q21a6 syndicat ecolib 
q21a7 nationalisation ecolib 
q21a12 privatisation ecolib 
q21a2 féminisme cultlib 
q21a8 autorité cultlib 
q21a13 islam immigration 
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2002, Wave 2 
var description category 
xq237 interdire les licenciements ecolib 
xq239 Difficultés économiques: Etat doit-il contrôler entreprises ? ecolib 
xq255 recherches sur le génôme humain cultlib 
xq58 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique cultlib 
xq39p2_4 les juifs ont trop de pouvoir en France cultlib 
xq39p2_1 trop d’immigrés en France immigration 
xq39p2_3 immigrés : source d’enrichissement culturel immigration 
 
Table A.2: Indicators used for the operationalization of issue-categories on the demand side in Germany  
 
1976 
var description category 
v503 Staatliche Kontrollen vs. wirtschaftliche Entscheidungen ecolib 
v505 Wohlfahrtsstaat: Staat vs. Eigenverantwortung welfare 
v504 Öffentliche Ordnung vs. persönliche Freiheit cultlib 
v518 Einstellung Scheidungsrecht cultlib 
v519 Einstellung Abtreibungsrecht cultlib 
v506 Politisches Mitspracherecht der Kirchen? cultlib 
 
1994 
var description category 
v39 Skala zur staatlichen Wirtschaftsbelebung ecolib 
v42 Skala zu staatlichem Wohnungsangebot ecolib 
v104 Zustimmung, dass Gehorsam und Disziplin wichtig cultlib 
v100 Mehr oder weniger Geld für Renten/Pensionen welfare 
v27 Wichtigkeit, dass Staat für mehr Wohnungen sorgt welfare 
v30 Wichtigkeit Zuzug von Ausländern zu regeln immig 
v41 Skala: Ausländerzuzug erleichtern/erschweren immig 
v44 Müssen sich Ausländer anpassen? immig 
v45 Ausländer zurückschicken? immig 
v46 Politische Rechte für Ausländer immig 
v47 Ausländer – Ehen mit Deutschen? immig 
 
1998 
var description category 
v177a Verantwortung Staat Arbeitsplatz für jeden ecolib 
v350b Einstellung Nationalisierung wichtiger Unternehmen ecolib 
v176c Wichtigkeit Gleichstellung cultlib 
v350a Stolz Deutscher zu sein cultlib 
v350c Wieder Mut zu einem starken Nationalgefühl cultlib 
v174b Skala Immigration immig 
v350l Überfremdung durch Ausländer immig 
v350n Zustimmung Ausländer sollten Landsleute heiraten immig 
v350r Verständnis für Angriffe Asylbewerberheime immig 
 
2002 
var description category 
v350b Einstellung Nationalisierung wichtiger Unternehmen ecolib 
v350a Stolz Deutscher zu sein cultlib 
v350c Wieder Mut zu einem starken Nationalgefühl cultlib 
v174b Skala Immigration immig 
v350l Überfremdung durch Ausländer immig 
v350n Zustimmung Ausländer sollten Landsleute heiraten immig 
v350r Verständnis für Angriffe Asylbewerberheime immig 
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